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THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
MARRINER W. MERRILL FAMILY 
FOUNDATION, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
THE STATE TAX COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Civil No. 
8192 
The Tax Commission believes that the Statement of 
Facts as set forth in plaintiff's brief is generally accurate 
and conforms to our understanding and interpretation of 
the Affidavit of Incorporation, the By~laws and the method 
of doing business of this taxpayer. By way of clarification, 
however, and in the hope of not being burdensomely repeti..-
tive, we would like to set forth in a cursory manner the 
facts which substantiate and support the decision of the 
Commission heretofore entered. They are as follows: 
A. From the Affidavit of Incorporation the following 
purposes are set forth: 
1. The investments and assets of the corporation 
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2 
are to be used "·for loaning or otherwise advancing 
money and property." (T r. 24). 
2. "For loaning or otherwise advancing money 
and property . . . to any and all descendents . . . of 
Marriner W. Merrill." (TR ... 24) 
3. "To aid and assist financially in the training ol 
any member of the family." (TR ... 24) 
B. The following methods and restrictions on con ... 
ducting the business of the corporation are taken from 
the By..-laws of the corporation: 
I. "The Board of Directors is given the power 
to loan or otherwise advance . . . funds for the accom ... 
plishment of the purposes of the foundation." (Tr. 18). 
2. ''Any member of the Marriner W. Merrill 
family is entitled to borrow and receive from the foun ... 
dation money as the Board of Directors may from time 
to time prescribe." (Tr. 18). 
C. Transcript testimony showed, and Mr. Merrill so 
testified, that the Affidavit of Incorporation was broad 
enough to permit the loaning of money to any descendent 
of Marriner W. Merrill by blood or by marriage. {Tr. 10). 
Mr. Merrill also testified that a donor or a member of 
the corporation might have a loan made to such donor 
and it would seem a fair inference to say that members of 
the corporation could therefore receive any or all benefits 
afforded by the corporation. (T r. 10..-11). 
We would like to draw the Court's attention, first, to 
the fact that there is not one bit of evidence in the Affidavit 
of Incorporation, in the By..-laws or in the testimony which 
would indicate that the corporation has given away any ... 
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thing of value in the past, that it presently intends to give 
anything away or that the board or any officer of the cor ... 
poration has the power to give away any of the assets of 
the corporation and, second, that there is no limitation or 
definition upon the word "education" in any of the forma ... 
tive documents of the corporation and it would therefore 
appear that the board of directors has the exclusive and 
sole power to determine the application of the word "edu ... 
cation" in the operation of the business of the corporation. 
It is, therefore, the position of the Commission that 
this corporation is organized exclusively for the purpose 
of making loans and receiving the increments therefrom in 
the form of interest for the purpose of perpetuating the 
economic level of a narrow, selfish and restricted group 
and as such, it is a taxable entity in the state of Utah 
for franchise tax purposes. 
POINT I 
IF THE MARRINER W. MERRILL FAMILY 
FOUNDATION, INC. IS ORGANIZED AND OPER .. 
ATED FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES, IT IS TAX ... 
ABLE UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE COR .. 
PORATION FRANCHISE TAX ACT. 
The plaintiff herein has argued extensively and per ... 
suasively that a charitable institution is exempt from 
taxation under the provisions of our act. We concur in 
their reasoning and in the authorities which they have 
cited, but we believe, and the evidence indicates, that the 
Marriner W. Merrill Family Foundation, Inc. is not or ... 
ganized for, nor intended to pursue, charitable activities 
as the term is understood in Anglo ... Saxon Jurisprudence. 
The plaintiff has attempted without reference to the facts 
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of its operation but with extensive free use of authority 
to show what is a charity. The oft ... quoted case of Bok 
vs. McCaughn, 4 2 F 2d, 616, states in part that charity is 
''whatever is given for the love of God or the love of your 
neighbor in the catholic or universal sense, given from 
these motives and to these ends free from the strain or 
taint of every consideration that is personal, private or 
selfish.'' This is the accepted definition of the term 
"charity" as we understand the term and which has 
been followed quite universally in construing acts similar 
to the one here under consideration. 
Conceding ·arguendo that the Marriner W. Merrill 
Family Foundation, Inc. is a "charity" we believe that the 
very testimony of one of the original incorporators who 
conceived this organization removes it from exemption 
under our act. You will recall that Section 59 ... 13 ... 4 ( 4) 
provides in part that ''. . . no part of the net earnings 
of which [the corporation] inure to the benefit of any 
private shareholder or individual." Mr. Merrill, however, 
has already testified that a donor of the corporation could 
receive any of the benefits of such corporation. He, of 
course, could not testify otherwise because the Affidavit 
of Incorporation and the By ... laws of the corporation clearly 
make the assets of the corporation and any increments 
thereto available to any of the descendants of Marriner 
W. Merrill. Obviously, and the affidavit so indicates, the 
incorporators and the donors of this corporation are such 
descendants and, consequently, any charitable function 
engaged in or pursued by this corporation could inure 
to the benefit of any or all of the private shareholders of 
the corporation or other individuals or of the donors of 
the fund created in the corporation. We are, of course, 
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not concerned here as to what the corporation will or 
won't do, but only what the corporation tan do by the 
provisions of it's Affidavit-by the business purpose or 
pursuit it is licensed or permitted by its franchise to do. 
See American Investment Corporation v. State Tax Com--
mission et al., 101 Utah 189, and 1938..-1 CB 168. 
This situation, of course, that is, where the private 
shareholders, individuals or donors of the alleged charitable 
organization could receive the increments and benefits of 
the funds, takes such organization out of the exempt 
category it might otherwise be in. See Scholarship Endow--
ment Foundation v. Nicholes, 106 Fed 2d 552. The 
obvious purpose in forming this type of an institution is 
to enable the donors to obtain a tax benefit and a deduc ... 
tion on their personal tax returns from the contributions 
made to the corporation which contributions if made 
direct to the donors would not otherwise be deductible for 
tax purposes. In other words, if the donors of the corpora ... 
tion made loans directly to their sons, daughters, grand--
sons, etc., such loans or gifts would not be deductible for 
tax purposes for the very reason that they are of a private 
and selfish nature. The founders of this corporation are 
merely attempting to accomplish indirectly and by means 
of the corporate veil and structure what they cannot do 
directly-they are certainly not concerned with the $10.00 
yearly tax paid to Utah-the state creating the entity. 
We would like to repeat and emphasize that if the 
plaintiff is a charitable organization, any of the participants 
in the corporation by way of shareholders, individuals or 
donors may receive any and all benefits from the corpora ... 
tion and, consequently one of the primary requirements 
set forth in the statute entitling the corporation to the 
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privilege of exempt status for corporation franchise tax 
purposes is not fulfilled or complied with. 
POINT II 
THE MARRINER W. MERRILL FAMILY FOUN--
DATION, INC., IS A CORPORATION ORGANIZED 
TO MAKE LOANS AND, THEREFORE, IS NOT 
EXEMPT FROM THE PAYMENT OF THE COR--
PORATION FRANCHISE TAX. 
For a corporation to be exempt from the corporation 
franchise tax of the state of Utah, such corporation must 
be organized so as to fall under one of the subdivisions 
of Section 59 ... 13 ... 4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The 
taxpayer has contended that, in their instance, the follow ... 
ing subsection ( 4) of the afore--cited statute is applicable: 
"Corporations -and any community chest, fund or 
foundation, organized and operated exclusively for 
religious, charitable, scientific, literary or educa ... 
tional purpose . . . no part of the net earnings of 
which inures to the benefit of any private share--
holder or individual" (see 59--13--4, U.C.A., 1953). 
This statute requires that a corporation, to come with ... 
in and be entitled to this exemption must, first, be or--
ganized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, 
scientific, literary or educational purposes, and, second, 
none of the net earnings can inure to the benefit of any 
private shareholder or individual. To ascertain if this 
corporation is organized pursuant to the foregoing pro ... 
vision of our code, we must determine if the Affidavit of 
Incorporation or the By ... }aws, as filed, so limit the opera--
tion that the aforesaid requirements are met. See American 
Investment Corp. vs. State Tax Comm. et al 101 Utah 189. 
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Of course, it is well to note here that for a corporation to 
be exempt from payment of the tax, it must clearly come 
within the provisions of the statute as set forth, for such 
exemption provisions are strictly construed against the 
corporation. Norville vs. State Tax Comm. 98 Utah 170, 
Equitable Life & Casualty vs. State Tax Comm. Utah 
( 19 52) , 112 ALR 1441. 
The affidavit of the Marriner W. Merrill Family 
Foundation, Inc., discloses that the corporation is organ--
ized solely and exclusively for the following purposes and 
with the following limitations on its method of conducting 
its business: 
a. The investments and assets of the corporation are 
to be used for loaning or otherwise advancing money 
and property. 
b. To any and all descendants ... of Marriner W. 
Merrill. 
c. To aid and assist financially in the training of any 
member of the family. 
The By--laws provide for the administration of the 
assets of the taxpayer for such loaning purposes under 
the following restrictions and limitations: 
a. The Board of Directors is given the power to loan 
or otherwise advance . . . funds for the accomplish--
ment of the purposes of the foundation. 
b. Any member of the Marriner W. Merrill Family 
is entitled to horrow and receive from the foundation 
money as the Board of Directors may from time to 
time prescribe. 
To support the foregoing and 1n affirroance thereof, 
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Mr. Merrill testined that the affidavit of incorporation 
was broad enough to permit the loaning of money to any 
descendant of Marriner W. Merrill by blood or by mar .. 
riage. 
We believe that the foregoing purposes and methods of 
operation of this corporation indicate clearly and with ... 
out ambiguity that it is organized for one purpose, and 
one purpose only, and that is to loan or to otherwise ad ... 
vance money and property. 
As such, and being confined to a method of operation 
which prohibits it from divesting itself of its assets by any 
method, we believe the corporation does not in substance 
constitute a· corporation entitled to exemption under the 
ordinary concepts applicable in such instance. Much has 
been written on the equitable philosophy of exemption· 
and it has appeared to us t~at the editors and writers on 
the subject make a basic justification for such exemption 
o~ the pr.et:nise and on the condition that such exemption 
should be founded upon the general good which accrued 
to the public as a whole; that such use or activity is one 
which is· ordinarily engaged in by the sovereign or sub ... 
stantially ·and realistically furthers the moral uplifting of 
society, not in a selfish and restricted field, but in the 
broad social sense. 
The explanation of the basis of such exemption is 
usually phrased as follows: 
"One class of tax exemptions more or less uni ... 
formly provided in the United States concerns 
private agencies performing functions which in the 
absence of such agencies would have to be under ... 
taken by the public. The most common instance 
of such private agencies performing public functions 
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is charitable and educational institutions to some 
extent health agencies, usually on a charitable basis, 
are also involved. It is commonly accepted that if, 
in the absence of a private enterprise, taxation 
would be necessary in order to discharge a needed 
function, the state may properly subsidize the In ... 
stitution which performs the service. A common 
method of subsidy is through tax exemption. (See 
General Theory of Tax Exemption, by the Tax 
Policy League, page 17). 
The construction of the words of the statute should be 
impressed with such a philosophy. The corporation here, 
of course, is engaged only in loaning or otherwise advancing 
mon~y or property. It is predicated upon the commercial 
formula of investing capital and, realizing the ultimate re ... 
turn thereof together with the increment of interest., The 
foundation here does not give anything for the "Love of 
Giving." This common formula and method of conducting 
an enterprise certainly does not fall within the spirit 
and intendment of exemptions from taxation as they are 
understood under our law. On the contrary, the purpose 
of this corporation smacks wholly of an enterprise pursued 
with the selfish and private incentive of accumulating 
money and property coupled with the economic and social 
perpetuation of one individual's descendants. 
Clearly, a loaning institution does not come within 
the letter, spirit wording or clear intendment of the fore ... 
going statute. 
POINT III. 
LIMITING THE LOANS OR ADVANCES OF THE 
FOUNDATION FOR PURPOSES OF EDUCATION 
DOES NOT MAKE THE CORPORATION ORGAN ... 
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IZED FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES i\ND 
THEREFORE IT IS NOT AN EXEMPT ORGAN, 
IZATION UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 
59, 13,;4 ( 4), U. C. A., 1953. 
As noted herein, the purpose of the Corporation is 
to make loans and advances to descendants of Marriner 
W. Merrill for educational purposes. Is the limitation 
labeled "education" on the loans such as would allow 
the exemption? We can find no precedents which would 
in any manner support this position, and the Courts have 
indicated that institutions claiming this exemption must 
have as its primary and direct purpose "education." Let's 
take first the citations given .by the taxpayer's counsel on 
page 22 and page 23 of their memorandum. They are as 
follows: 
''A corporation organized to maintain a band for 
giving free public concerts and the promotion of 
musical art is exempt as an educational institution, 
the terms not being confined to colleges and schools 
(LT. 14 75, 1,;2 C. B. 184). This bulletin of the In, 
come Tax Division of the Internal Revenue Bureau 
goes on to ·say that the fostering of an appreciation 
or a desire of good music and of the promotion of 
musical art are acually of an educational nature. 
"An association organized and operated exclu ... 
sively for giving musical concerts was exempt as 
educational. (S.M. 1176, I.C.B. 147). 
"The National Tax Association is exempt, being 
organized and operated exclusively for scientific 
and educational purposes (special rule, February 
11, 1939, 393 C.C.H., Par. 6180). 
"College students league, organized to bring 
about an open ... minded consideration of social, in ... 
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dustrial, political and international questions, was 
exempt as exclusively educational (1.1. 1224, 1 ... 1 
C. B. 256) ." 
It is pertinent to note that every one of these organ ... 
izations cited above actually participated and engaged in 
"education" as such. The corporation, on the other hand, 
does not itself participate in "education" and is not formed 
for that purpose. It has been dedicated for the sole pur ... 
pose of making loans so that descendants of Marriner W. 
Merrill may attain higher education. All of the citations 
we find are along the same vein-that is, the organization 
itself, to qualify for an exemption for educational purposes, 
has been actually engaged in the educational activity-
not the remote purpose of making of loans so that certain 
restricted persons could attain an education. It seems to 
us that such loaning activity is too far removed from the 
educational purpose contemplated by the statute and all 
of the precedents we have read would certainly indicate 
this distinction sound. 
By way of further analogy, would a textbook manu..-
facturer be deemed organized for educational purposes? 
It would seem that education in this instance would be 
secondary and incidental. And the same would be true 
of corporations organized to manufacture uniforms, sup..-
plies, desks and innumerable other items necessary and 
essential to our educational system. Of course, such cor ... 
porations would be organized for profit purposes and there--
fore not exempt, but the point is, that the basic structure 
is secondary to education and educational purposes. The 
same is true of this Corporation, the main feature and 
primary purpose being to provide a source of funds for 
loans to enable the descendants of Marriner W. Merrill to 
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seek higher education, not in the first instance for educa ... 
tion as such. Another strong analogy would be that of 
conforming the purpose of this business corporation to any 
lending institution-that is-their primary purpose is to 
make loans, while what the money is to be used for is 
strictly secondary and incidental to the primary purpose 
of making such loans. 
It also seems to us that the fundamental principle on 
which the right of exemption rests is not present here-
that is, that the institution must be rendering an essential 
service to the people of the commonwealth, thereby re .. 
lieving to that extent the charge on the general public. 
See Layman Foundation vs. Louisville, 232 Ky. 259, 22 
S.W .. (2nd) 622. Here, the Corporation is not relieving 
to any extent a charge on the public by its making loans 
to descendants of Marriner W. Merrill. We know of no 
incident in history whereby any body politic has engaged 
in the function of loaning money to any specific group for 
educational purposes or even to the public as a whole for 
such purposes. Consequently, and we emphasize, no public 
purpose is here served by the Foundation's engaging in 
the loaning business-but only the selfish benefits accruing 
to the descendants of one person. 
It should also be noted before passing this point, that 
the assets of the Corporation are theoretically never ulti .. 
mately consumed or used for the purpos~s of education or 
charity or anything else. Its assets are merely loaned and 
returned together with interest and, therefore, there can 
never be a true beneficiary. of any of the assets, money or 
property. 
Therefore, by analogy and common logic, the founda ... 
tion does not fulfill the requirement set forth in our act 
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that the corporation be formed for "educational purposes'' 
to qualify for exemption. 
POINT IV 
THE CORPORATION "BENEFITS," IF LOANS 
COULD BE CONSTRUED AS BENEFITS, ARE 
AVAILABLE ONLY TO A PRIVATE, RESTRICTED 
AND SELFISH GROUP AND, THEREFORE, THE 
CORPORATION IS NOT AN EXEMPT ORGANIZA.-
TION. 
As noted in the· Statement of Facts, the loans or ad ... 
vances of the Corporation are available only to "any and 
all descendants or husbands or wives of such descendants 
of Marriner W. Merrill." The descendants of Marriner 
W. Merrill, of course, are a limited group. The question 
is, however, whether the group is so restricted and limited 
as to remove it from an organization which furthers so--
ciety and the public, as a group, rather than the uplifting of 
the beneficiaries or members of the group as such members. 
This issue is one of degree insofar as the restriction 
or limitation of the group or the members of the organ--
ization for exemption is concerned. (See Amy Hutchinson 
Crellin vs. Commission, 46 B. T. A. 1152). The cases 
which have been decided by the courts and the Board of 
Tax Appeals on this point appear, on their own facts, to 
be inconsistent and irreconcilable in the application of any 
set rule. However, we believe that the inconsistency arises, 
not by reason of the rule itself, but by reason of the equities 
involved in the specific fact situation. In other words, the 
courts do not defeat an organization from coming within 
the exempt category merely by reason of the fact alone 
that the benefits accruing from the organization pass to 
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a restricted group, if a general public purpose is served. 
For example, the authorities cited by the taxpayer show 
generally that when the purposes of the corporation are 
for "public charities" the "restricted group" doctrine is 
given a broad interpretation. 
On the other hand, there are cases in which the group 
is so restricted that the organization is obviously organized 
for private and restricted purposes, and in these instances, 
regardless of the "charitable purpose," the courts have not 
swayed in refusing the exemption. For in.stance, in the 
Crellin case above cited, the trustor provided, among other 
things, that the benefits of the trust could be received by 
certain named grandnieces and grandnephews of the 
trustor for educational purposes. The Board held that the 
trust was not organized exclusively for public purposes and 
the clause allowing for trust benefits to accrue to the desig..-
nated beneficiaries removed the organization from the 
exempt category. A case which involved facts similar to 
those here considered was treated by the Board in the 
James Sprunt Benevolent Trust, 20 B.T.A. 19. In the 
Sprunt case the organization was created to provide bene..-
fits for the support of those of the trustor's children and 
descendants "who may be destitute" and the Board held 
that this organization was created for a private, selfish and 
restricted group and purpose and, therefore, did not come 
within the rule as to public grouping and was not an ex..-
empt organization. 
The taxpayer's counsel has cited the case of Emerit E. 
Baker, Inc. 40 B.T.A. 555, in which case he contends the 
Board granted exemption to a "restricted group." In the 
Baker case a corporation was organized to provide annuity 
payments to Baker's· widow and education expenses of 
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certain designated relatives. In addition, however, broad 
public purposes were outlined for the use of the funds in 
the corporation for charitable and educational purposes. 
The court held that these broad public purposes would 
not be jeopardized by removing the corporation from its 
tax exempt status merely by reason of the subsidiary and 
incidental purposes of providing annuity payments to the 
widow and educational payments to the relatives. We 
respectfully submit to the court that if the Merrill corpora ... 
tion had broad public purposes for charitable and educa ... 
tional benefits accruing to an unrestricted group in addi ... 
tion to the present benefits of loans to the relatives of 
Marriner W. Merrill, the Baker case would be a precedent 
to control in this situation. But the precise point upon 
which the Baker case went before the court, that is, that 
the benefits accruing to the restricted group of relatives 
characterized the exempt status of the donor is the sole 
purpose of this corporation and not an incidental pursuit 
of broad public benefits. The court there stated: 
"Trusts or corporations organized and operated for 
the benefit of the donor's relatives or in general 
for personal and private purposes, rather than for 
public charities, are not within the statute. See 
James Sprunt Benevolent Trust, Harry C. Dubois 
31 B.T.A. 239." 
It seems obvious that the facts in the Sprunt and 
Baker cases, insofar as they pertain to the relationship 
of the class benefited, and the facts here considered, are 
identical and the obvious conclusion based on precedent 
is that this corporation must be held to be an organiza ... 
tion created for private rather than public purposes and, 
therefore, is not exempt under the statute. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
REPLY TO THE ARGUMENT OF 
THE PLAINTIFF 
The taxpayer's brief is replete with cases and argu ... 
ment which lends substance to exempting those organiza ... 
tions devoted · to and dedicated for the moral, spiritual 
and economic uplifting of that minority of society less for ... 
tunate than those in the donative position. It is character..-
istic in a society based upon the principles of a republican 
form of government that assistance, charity and love should 
spring, not from the grace of the sovereign, but from the 
love of a compassionate society. In such a public trust, and 
founded upon these principles, organizations are relieved of 
their right and responsibility of supporting through the pay ... 
ment of their just proportion of the tax burden, those insti..-
tutions which create, protect and foster their existence. The 
corporation here, we respectfully submit, has been con..-
ceived, is dedicated and is restricted to pursuing the purpose 
of assuring and perpetuating the economic position of 
the descendants of one individual. Our society has never 
supported an exemption on this basis, nor should it support 
it now. We would like to draw the attention of this Court 
to the numerous citations set forth in plaintiff's brief with 
the reminder to this Court that this corporation has never 
even contemplaed divesting itself of its assets. Nothing is 
given to even the descendants of the members, donors, 
or shareholders of this corporation. Can thfs be said to 
be, under these facts, a charitable institution? What does 
this corporation give? 
We believe that the substance of the argument is best 
placed in its correct proportion if the corporation, as 
such, is hypothetically removed from the argument, and 
the question is then stated: Can an individual be declared 
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to be exempt from the payment of taxes because he makes 
loans to his relatives so they can attain and pursue a 
higher education? 
We respectfully submit that the decision of the State 
Tax Commission, declaring that the Marriner W. Merrill 
Family Foundation, Inc. is a corporation subject to the 
payment of the franchise tax of the State of Utah, should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully, 
C. PRESTON ALLEN, 
General Counsel. 
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